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Canadian Constitutional Law: Presentation to the
Annual Conference of International Association of Law
Libraries
PETER W . HOGG
Introduction
When I was asked to give this talk it occurred to me that it might be
interesting to think aloud about some of the changes in constitutional law—
and in writing about constitutional law—that have occurred since I came to
Canada. I am a New Zealander by birth, but I was teaching at the Faculty of
Law of Monash University in Melbourne, Australia, when I came to the
Osgoode Hall Law School on a one-year visit in the summer of 1970. During
that visiting year, the faculty decided to offer me a permanent appointment.
This was done over the objection of one of my colleagues, R. J. Gray, who
claimed that my lectures would require simultaneous translation, and that I
would not meet the height requirements for Canadian citizenship. Anyway I
was persuaded to stay (and three years later I became a Canadian citizen).
The then Dean, Gerald LeDain, in giving me my teaching
assignments for the next year, which was 1971-72, asked me to teach
Canadian constitutional law. I objected that I knew nothing about Canadian
constitutional law. He brushed that aside. He explained that he only had four
teachers for the five sections of first-year constitutional law. So I started
teaching constitutional law.
Constitutional Law Before the Charter of Rights
Canada is a federal country with its capital in Ottawa and it now
comprises ten provinces and three territories. Its constitution is the
Constitution Act, 1867, formerly the British North America Act, 1867, which
is a statute of the United Kingdom Parliament at Westminster, which had
authority to legislate for British colonies. A united Canada had to be a federal
* Peter W. Hogg, CC, Q.C, Professor Emeritus, Osgoode Hall Law School,
York University; Scholar in Residence, Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP, Toronto.
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country because of its huge size and the diversity of its regions, but especially
because of the fact that its French-speaking population is concentrated in
Quebec, which has always been very protective of its French language and
culture on a continent where English is the dominant language. The
Constitution Act, 1867 divides legislative authority between the Parliament of
Canada in Ottawa and the Legislatures ofthe ten provinces. Disputes about
the extent ofthe legislative authority of each ofthe two levels of govemment
are frequent, and are adjudicated by the courts and ultimately the Supreme
Court of Canada.'
When I started teaching constitutional law in Canada in 1971, there
were two casebooks on constitutional law, one by Bora Laskin^ and the other
by Noel Lyon and Ron Atkey.^ Ron Atkey also joined the Osgoode Hall Law
School faculty in 1971 and he used the Lyon and Atkey book, as did Irwin
Cotler, as I recall. The rest of us used the Laskin casebook, which was a great
work of scholarship, but very difficult for first-year students. The only
textbook that could conceivably be regarded as current was F.P. Varcoe, The
Constitution of Canada (2nd ed. 1965), but this was a short work that was far
from comprehensive. For more ambitious works you had to go back to
Clement, 3"* ed. 1916," Lefroy, 1918,̂  Riddell, 1923* and Kennedy, 2nd
edition, 1938^~all works that were so out of date that they did not even
conceive the subject in recognizable modem terms.
One ofthe difficulties with the Laskin casebook for me was that it
was exclusively devoted to federalism. Laskin, like the other great academic
constitutional lawyers of his time, Frank Scott, Bill Lederman and Vincent
MacDonald, for example, was preoccupied with the political issues of
federalism and with judicial review ofthe federal distribution of powers.
Federalism was the dominating constitutional issue, and had been for many
' The final decision-maker used to be the Privy Council in London, but the
authority ofthe Privy Council was terminated in 1949.
^ B. Laskin, Canadian Constitutional Law (Carswell, Toronto, 3rd ed. 1969 by
Laskin, 4* ed. 1975 by Abel, 5* ed. 1986 by Finkelstein).
•* J.N. Lyon and R.G. Atkey, Canadian Constitutional Law in a Modern
Perspective (U. Toronto Press, 1970).
" W.H.P. Clement, The Law ofthe Canadian Constitution (Carswell, 3"" ed.,
1916).
^ A.H.F. Lefroy, Canadian Constitutional Law (Caisweil, 1918).
* W.R. Riddell, The Canadian Constitution in Form and Fact (Columbia U. P.,
1923).
^ W.P.M. Kennedy, The Constitution of Canada 1534-1937 (Oxford U.P., 2"''
ed., 1938).
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years. There was nothing in the Laskin casebook on the sources of Canadian
constitutional law, on the evolution from colony to independent country, on
responsible goverrmient, on the Crown, or on civil liberties, for example. I
was interested in these kinds of things—constitutional ideas that Canada
shared with New Zealand and Australia. So I started producing notes for the
students to supplement the casebook. Of course, I quickly became interested
in Canadian federalism as well, and gradually leamed something about it,
especially from the writings of Laskin and Lederman. Then, as I came up to
my first sabbatical leave in 1976-77, it occurred to me for the first time that I
had the basis for a text on constitutional law, and in the course of a year spent
on leave at the University of Toronto I expanded the student notes into a
textbook. That was the origin of my book on Constitutional Law of Canada,
the first edition of which was published in 1977.̂
The Charter of Rights
The Constitution Act, 1867 did not contain a bill of rights on the
American model. There were some guarantees of language and religion
rights, which were preoccupations in 1867, but the Canadian framers of
confederation looked to the United Kingdom for their inspiration, not the
United States, and the British view at that time was that human rights were
best safeguarded without a constitutional bill of rights. And it is tme that,
even in countries that have bills of rights, the most important protections of
human rights come from democracy, the rule of law, the independence ofthe
judiciary, and the independence ofthe bar. However, after the Second World
War, it became widely accepted that a constitutional bill of rights was an
indispensable addition to the suite of safeguards that were exemplified by the
legal system ofthe United Kingdom. All ofthe British colonies that achieved
independence after the War insisted on having bills of rights in their
constitutions—^which were duly drafted in the United Kingdom by British
constitutional lawyers! Canada adopted a statutory bill of rights in 1960, the
Canadian Bill of Rights, but because it did not have constitutional force it did
not have much effect. However, in 1982, by virtue ofthe driving force of
Prime Minister Pierre Tmdeau, Canada adopted the Charter of Rights, which
is contained in the Constitution Act, 1982, another statute ofthe United
Kingdom Parliament which, like the Constitution Act, 1867, does have
* P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Carswell, 1977, 2"" ed., 1985, 3"*
ed., 1992,4"' ed., 1997, 5th ed., 2007, now also in loose-leaf format annually
supplemented).
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constitutional force; it is supreme over ordinary federal and provincial
statutes.'
After the adoption of the Charter of Rights in 1982, everything
changed in the world of Canadian constitutional law. Suddenly, the Dean's
problems in staffing constitutional law were over. Everyone on the faculty of
the Osgoode Hall Law School (and the other law faculties in Canada) wanted
to teach constitutional law. Everyone who applied for an academic
appointment wanted to teach constitutional law.
The Canadian courts were deluged with constitutional cases. The
volume of cases was truly disturbing. A study of s. 15 (the equality
guarantee) by Gwen Brodsky and Sheila Day in 1989 found that, in the first
three years of s. 15 (which came into force in 1985, three years after the rest
of the Charter) there were 590 cases (of which two-thirds were reported) in
which the validity of a law was attacked under s. 15.'" And that was just the
equality guarantee! The flood of cases was matched by a comparable flood of
academic writing. Canadian law schools were now well staffed with faculty,
and a remarkable number of them had become instant constitutional
lawyers."
It took a few years for the flood of Charter cases to find its way to the
Supreme Court of Canada, but the Court took to its new task of judicial
review with enthusiasm. It became a more "activist" court than the Supreme
Court of the United States, even more so than the Warren Court of the 1960s.
Hamar Foster and an American co-author published a study showing that
those Charter guarantees that had counterparts in the American Bill of Rights
were for the most part given wider interpretations than the American court
had provided.'^ More statutes were struck down here than in the United
' The embarrassment of having to get constitutional instruments enacted in the
United Kingdom was also eliminated in 1982 when amending procedures were
adopted that could be operated within Canada and the U.K. Parliament terminated its
authority over Canada. The story is told in Hogg, note 7, above, ch. 3.
'" Brodsky and Day, Canadian Charter Rights for Women (1989).
" As I write in 2012, globalization has for the time being supplanted
constitutional law as the academic lawyer's pursuit of choice.
'̂  R. Harvie and H. Foster, "Ties that Bind? The Supreme Court of Canada,
American Jurisprudence, and the Revision of Canadian Criminal Law under the
Charter" (1990) 28 Osgoode Hall L.J. 729; R. Harvie and H. Foster, "Different
Drummers, Different Drums: The Supreme Court of Canada, American Jurisprudence
and the Continuing Revision of Canadian Criminal Law under the Charter" (1992) 24
Ottawa L. Rev. 39.
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States. Aggressive remedies for unconstitutional laws became commonplace.
These included the severance of words from a statute in order to alter the
meaning intended by the legislature and the "reading in" (that is the addition)
of new words to a statute that the legislature had never enacted. And
procedural restraints developed by the American court (Alexander Bickel's
"passive virtues") through such doctrines as standing, ripeness, mootness,
hypothetical questions and political questions were often disregarded or
rejected.'^
All this had a great effect on my textbook, the first edition of which
had been published in 1977 and had taken up 500 pages. It went into a second
edition in 1984, and jumped to 1,000 pages. The third edition jumped to
1,500 pages. The fourth edition was longer still. The fifth edition, completed
in 2007, is just under 2,000 pages and is in two volumes. It is now in
looseleaf version as well as conventional bound volumes, and preparing the
annual supplement to keep the book up to date occupies an important part of
my working time all year. Oddly enough, it is still the only comprehensive
textbook on the constitutional law of Canada. Of course, our market is only
one tenth the size ofthat of the United States, and there are only a few
comprehensive texts there.
The Legitimacy of Judicial Review
After the adoption of the Charter of Rights in 1982, the increased role
of the courts in the formation of Canada's public policy naturally led to debate
about the legitimacy of judicial review, just as the Warren Court had sparked
a similar debate in the United States. Unsurprisingly, abortion, pornography,
women's rights, gay and lesbian rights and the rights of criminal defendants
were among the issues that attracted public attention. In the law reviews, the
legitimacy debate was quite sophisticated, building as it did on the immense
and subtle literature accumulated in the United States.
What was lacking in the legitimacy debate in Canada was any
empirical evidence of the actual impact of judicial review on the law-making
process in Canada. In an article published in 1997,''' Allison Bushell (now
Thornton) and I investigated the sequels to all cases in which the Supreme
Court of Canada had struck down a law on Charter grounds. What we found
'̂  P.W. Hogg, "The Law-Making Role of the Supreme Court of Canada" (2001)
80 Can. Bar Rev. 173.
'"* P.W. Hogg and A. Bushell, "The Charter Dialogue between Courts and
Legislatures" (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 76.
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was rather surprising. Out of 66 cases in which laws had been struck down on
Charter grounds, more than two-thirds of the cases were followed by the
enactment of a new law that continued to carry out the policy of the old,
invalid law. Most of the time, the Court did not have the last word!
There were a number of reasons for the ability of Canadian legislative
bodies to take a second look at legislation that had been struck down by the
Court. One was the presence in the Charter of Rights of an override clause (s.
33), which enabled Parliament or the Legislature to override the Charter of
Rights by inserting a "notwithstanding clause" in legislation. This has been
rarely used, because it constitutes an acknowledgment that the legislative
body is legislating in violation of the Charter, but when it is used it allows the
legislation to overcome a Charter decision. The second, and more important,
provision was s. 1 of the Charter, which makes the Charter subject to "such
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free
and democratic society". Section 1 allows a legislative body to overcome a
Charter decision by making changes to the invalid law to satisfy the Court's
jurisprudence on "reasonable limits". Neither of these loopholes exists in the
American Bill of Rights. And what Allison's and my article showed was that
our Charter led to a weaker form of judicial review than the strong form
assumed to be characteristic of the United States. Allison and I argued that
judicial review in Canada should be regarded not as imposing a veto on
democratic legislatures, but as contributing to a "dialogue" between the Court
and the legislatures.
Our 1997 dialogue article led to a "dialogue on dialogue" as the
Supreme Court of Canada picked up the idea and gave it some unexpected
twists, and many commentators weighed in, either criticizing or elaborating
on the thesis. In 2007 (with the help of a third co-author. Wade Wright), we
published a sequel article that attempted to review the decisions and the
academic literature that had talked about the 1997 article.'^ In the 2007
article, we also researched the legislative sequels to all the Charter cases since
1997, and we found that the same pattern had continued: a decision striking
down a law on Charter grounds was usually followed by a new law that
accomplished the same legislative objective. The "dialogue" that we had
identifled in 1997 was still alive and well in 2007.
'̂  P.W. Hogg, A.A. Bushell Thornton, W.K. Wright, "Charter Dialogue
Revisited—Or Much Ado about Metaphors" (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1.
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Conclusion
The important point, I think, is this: Canada has a unique constitutional
history, and its constitutional documents are naturally unique too. The text of
the division of powers (federalism) was influenced by the American
Constitution (the only useful federal precedent in 1867), but departed
markedly from it to respond to the political exigencies and ideas ofthe
Canadian colonists. The text ofthe Charter of Rights was influenced by the
American Bill of Rights, but was also influenced by intemational human
rights instruments (the source of s. 1) and by purely Canadian ideas (such as s.
33). The Supreme Court of Canada has developed, and continues to develop, a
distinctively Canadian exegesis of these instmments. The academic
commentary on the Canadian constitution is also distinctively Canadian,
drawing on British roots, and influenced by American political and legal
literature, to be sure, but ultimately about the govemance stmcture of Canada,
a country like no other.
